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IRISH COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW VOL 31993 
Government, Propaganda and the 
Irish News Agency 
John Horgan 
Origins of the Irish News Agency 
The theme of identity forged in adversity has bulked large on the agenda of the 
founders of many small nation states, and the case of Ireland is no exception. The extent 
and nature of the Irish diaspora, in addition, has given this theme an added dimension: 
its propagation to the world at large. Bending the world's ear to the cause of righting 
. Ireland's wrongs has been a constant, if rarely successful, strand in Irish nationalist 
policy for over two centuries. It is only in more recent times, however, that it has become 
more formally associated with the official structures of the State, most notably in the 
seven-year experimental existence of the Irish News Agency (I.N.A.). The history of this 
institution, unique in the Irish administrative system, provides us with important 
perspectives on government ideology in relation to Northern Ireland and in relation to 
the news media themselves, as well as on the nature of professional journalism in 
Ireland in the 1950s. 
In 1945 Sean MacBride, recently elected to the Dail and founder of the Clann na 
Poblachta party, wrote to Eamonn de Valera ('Dear Chief). with whom he had evidently 
been in contact earlier on the same Issue, urging the establishment of an Irish news 
agency to put Ireland's arguments· about partition to the world, and to obviate the 
situation whereby all news about Ireland carried on the international news agencies was 
sub-edited - often prejudicially - in London1. De Valera passed the proposal on to the 
Director of the Government Information Bureau, Frank Gallagher (an able 
newspaperman who had been the first editor of the Irish Press, and who had 
subsequently found refuge in Mr de Valera's service after tangling with the newspaper's 
board of management). MacBride was nothing If not enthusiastic: in a period of some 
five weeks at the end of the year, he wrote to de Valera and Gallagher three times, 
setting out his conviction that such a Government-subsidized agency was essential 
a) 'to counter hostile propaganda'. 
b) because other countries had officially supported news agencies, 
c) because it was unlikely that an Irish News Agency would be a paying proposition 
in its early years, and 
d) that private setting up of the agency would mean that it would be 'under the 
control of financial interests' 2 • 
Gallagher (and, one presumes, de Valera). expressed reservations. Gallagher's first 
objection was that the action of the Dail in voting public money to support such an 
undertaking would be so misrepresented 'as to kill all hope of the agency ever 
succeeding'. In other countries, he observed wistfully, governments were freer to 'do a 
good national act without it being made into a crime'. Sensing. a log-jam, MacBride 
backtracked, suggesting in his last letter that all-party agreement for the agency might 
be secured, and that the best option might be that the editors or managements of the 
three Dublin dailies might be asked to consider and report on the possibility of setting 
up the agency themselves. The latter proposal was the first to get under Gallagher's 
guard. The whole situation would have a different aspect', he averred, 'if the Initiative 
came from the pressmen' 3 • Nonetheless, this too was shelved. 
It was some three and a half years later that MacBride, as the newly-appointed 
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Minister for External Affairs, was at last in a position to put his theory into practice. His 
qualifications were not only political but professiona]. For many years he was a 
correspondent for the French Havas news agency (later to be incorporated into Agencies 
France Presse). was a member of the National Union of Journalists, and took pride in 
telling the Dail that he was 'probably the only member to go out on strike and picket a 
newspaper office' 4 . His searches in the governmental archives were fruitless - de Valera 
had apparently removed one of the relevant files on leaving office, regarding it as 
personal 5 - but his enthusiasm was undimmed by the passage of time. In January 1949 
a memorandum from the Department of External Affairs to the Government noted that 
'while we have 32, 171 civil servants, there is not one of them who is charged with any 
6 function in relation to partition' . The contrast with the situation prevailing in Northern 
Ireland was underlined. 
On 18 May, the proposal was fleshed out in a more detailed memorandum, proposing 
the establishment of an Irish News Agency whose publications 
should include reports of important pronouncements on partition. It 
should, be strictly non-party and non-political in the sense that it 
should only deal with matters of foreign policy and matters that are 
non-controversial at home. 
It would be run with a small government subsidy by a company specially established for 
the purpose. 
The [Agency's] Diplomatic Correspondent would in effect be the 
Government spokesman and propagandist. His task would be to 
publicize in the form of news the Government's policy on partition. 
There would be offices in London and New York, and the annual cost to public funds 
would be of the order of £20,000. Three days later, the Government minutes discreetly 
recorded the approval of a 'number of proposals ... in connection with partition', of 
which the creation of the Irish News Agency was undoubtedly one. 
The next task was the passage of the necessary legislation, and the promotion of the 
concept to Irish public and journalistic opinion. The latter task was far from ea~y: 
influential sections of journalistic opinion were implacably opposed to the creation of the 
agency and were ultimately, as will be seen, partially responsible for its demise. 
Even before the Irish News Agency Bill 7 reached the floor of the Dail, journalistic 
sabres were being rattled in their scabbards. A low-key report in the Irish Independent 
(17 June 1949) indicated that the service to be provided would be 'not elaborate' and 
would be confined to airmail and short-wave radio. Two days later, its sister paper, the 
Sunday Independent, went on the offensive. Money spent on the new agency would be 
'largely wasted'. The Government's proposal, the paper added, 'smacks too much of a 
plan to set up a propaganda department. Neither Ireland nor the rest of the world wants 
it' (19 June 1949). MacBride moved swiftly into a damage limitation exercise. The new 
agency, he told the Irish Independent In a special interview, 'will not replace existing 
media for the supply of Irish news, but will supplement them' (27 June 1949). The editor 
of the Irish Independent was unconvinced. The scheme, he commented, had 'not been 
sufficiently thought out', and a committee to examine the proposal would, perhaps, be a 
better idea (7 July 1949). Over in Westmoreland Street, The Irish Times (where the 
editor, R.M. Smyllie, writing as 'Nichevo' indicated that he had briefly considered the 
idea of starting an Irish news agency before abandoning the idea on grounds of cost) was 
8 
more patrician, but no less suspicious . 'We do not believe', it stated editorially, 'that the 
existing news agencies are prejudiced against [Ireland] .. . Mr MacBride's diminutive 
agency certainly will not galvanise the apathetic audiences of the great world into a state 
of appreciation' (15 July 1949). 
The opposition to MacBride was formidable, both inside and outside the Dail. Inside, 
sean Lemass was at his most rumbustious. Additionally he had, as Managing Director 
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of the Irish Press newspaper (a position he Was offered when Flanna Fail were put out of 
office the previous year, and one which he had embraced with his customary vigour and 
enthusiasm). more than a passing interest in this particular scheme. Flanna Fail, out of 
office for the first time since 1932, had a truffle-hound's nose for proposals that were 
conceptually or financially shaky, and Lemass, especially where matters of company 
legislation were concerned, had a keener nose than most. Outside, the National Union of 
Journalists (or at least some of Its adherents) was getting Its lobbying apparatus Into 
gear. The NUJ, although weak, was in the process of establishing Itself as the major 
trade union for journalists in Ireland. It had more than four times the membership of its 
main rival, the Institute of Journalists. 
The main plank of MacBride's argument was, indeed, the one calculated to appeal 
most to Flanna Fail: the thesis that Ireland should throw off the shackles of domination 
by the foreign news agencies as it had thrown off those of foreign political domination. 
'Because of transmission difficulties, because of our unimportance, if you like, in the 
stream of world affairs', he told the Dail, 'all the news that emanates in Ireland is 
canalised through London'. The need for an independent source of news about Ireland 
was threefold: 
first of all, unlike most other countries we have a national objective 
to achieve. We still have to gain full control of our own country ... We 
have to counteract a good deal of foreign propaganda ... We need 
news channels of our own in order to encourage the development of 
our industrial life. of our foreign trade, of our tourist traffic. to make 
known our cultural developments and also to make known our 
viewpoints in the field of international affairs as the need arises. 9 
Blithely quoting de Valera himself (who had told the Dail the previous year 
that the dwindling flow of emigrants to those countries ·most sympathetic to 
us' necessitated the provision of fresh channels of communication), he made 
no bones about the fact that the new service would not be a paying 
proposition, and underlined Its principal function as a conduit for the 
Government's anti-partition policy abroad. Some of his arguments were 
acceptable only if his listeners were prepared to accept that the same word 
could embody two different and opposed meanings within the compass of a 
single paragraph ... It Is not, 
to be a propaganda machine or a machine which will present news 
other than In an objective, truthful and accurate way. It may be said 
that it will serve as a propaganda medium in so far as one of its main 
functions will be to place Ireland on the map and that to that extent 
it will be serving a proganda service by making Ireland known 
throughout the world in different spheres. w 
It was not intended that the news agency should be the official mouthpiece 
of the Government: that function was being very efficiently performed by the 
II Government Information Bureau -but, when necessary, 'it will give Ireland's 
viewpoint on political affairs'. It was not going to be a 'political propaganda 
machine', but one of its essential functions would be to negative 'unfriendly, 
hostile or sensational propaganda about Ireland 12• 
This stylish exercise in having your cake and eating it was. accompanied by the 
offering of one substantial - and ultimately fatal - hostage to fortune: an undertaking 
that the new INA would not deal in 'hot news', I.e. the kind of news that daily and weekly 
Irish media were generally in the habit of collecting for themselves. This commitment 
was evidently designed to mollifY the NUJ, whose members' low earnings were frequently 
supplemented by work as correspondents for larger or foreign media enterprises. In the 
event, It failed to do even that and, in addition, presented the Opposition with a weapon 
which It used to considerable effect. 
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De Valera defended his own record by arguing that what he had most in mind was 
the proposed short-wave service (viewed with some disfavour by the Inter-Party 
Government}, but it was left to Sean Lemass to mount the most ferocious attack on 
MacBride for 'setting up a company which will not be a company and ... a news agency 
13 h which will not be a news agency' . Th~ NUJ troops came in behind Lemass in the s ape 
of Sean McCann, a senior journalist on the Irish Press and a Flanna Filii deputy, who 
told the Dail that he was 'speaking on behalf of working journalists who feel that their 
livelihood is being attacked in this Bill'. If the agency became, in time, a paying 
proposition, 'that can only mean that the agency will be in competition with other 
journalists who send 'copy' out of this country'14• 
In point of fact, the agency was, in the Bill, given the powers normally pertaining to a 
news agency, i.e. power to distribute news inside Ireland. When this was pointed out by 
an Opposition deputy who wanted to limit the dissemination of news to places outside 
the country, Mr MacBride gave his reasons. If such a statutory ban were in place, the 
agency would, for example, be unable to provide news to the proposed short wave 
service. Nor would it be able to disseminate news to the Irish-based correspondents of 
foreign newspapers and agencies. 
If he had thought that the latter explanation would blunt the edge of the attack by 
the resident correspondents of American and other agencies, the Minister was being too 
optimistic by half. His principal opponent, Sean Lemass, immediately focused on the 
central flaw in the Government's strategy: if the agency did not disseminate 'hot news', it 
would not be an agency; if it did, it would imperil the livelihood of Irish journalists, 
because foreign newspapers and magazines will be supplied with 'free news' by civil 
servants, while trade union journalists who depend for a living on the dissemination of 
news to foreign journals will be forced into unemploymene 5 . 
MacBride had in fact already met an NUJ deputation, whose anxieties, quite 
naturally, were that in so far as it was possible, the staffing of the news agency should 
be from members of the NUJ or some other recognised trade union16 . These anxieties he 
was prepared to meet in full: the other matters raised by the union in the circular which 
had been sent to Lemass were not raised 'as such' by the delegation. Taking MacBride's 
words at face value, what appears to have happened is that there were two schools' of 
thought within the NUJ: the central, organizational one related to the need to ensure 
that journalistic work continued to be performed by journalists, whether they were 
employed by the State or by anyone else: the second, reflecting the special interest of a 
sub-set of NUJ members, saw the agency as a direct threat- not to their livelihoods, for 
most if not all of them were in senior editorial positions in major Dublin media - but to 
the additional payment they received for acting as 'stringers' for foreign news agencies. 
MacBride correctly identified the union's major concern, but dangerously 
underestimated the power and influence of the foreign correspondents' group, as later 
events made clear. 
The agency thus created was an oddly-shaped enterprise. According to the brief given 
to it by its progenitor in the Dail, it was to be occupied primarily with publicising the 
Government's attitude on partition abroad; it would work in harmony with the existing 
media; it would be a small organisation costing around £20,000 per year in public 
subsidies, and issuing possibly 1,000 words a day; it would not deal in 'hot news'; and it 
would be assisted by an Advisory Board, which might also facilitate the eventual 
takeover of the agency by the national newspapers. 
The first year 
As things turned out, virtually every one of these parameters had been shattered 
within the agency's first year in operation. November 1950 saw a major reversal of 
policy: 'the task of publicizing partition abroad', Mr MacBride told Mr Lemass in the 
Dail, 'is the responsibility of other agencies ... The INA is not an organ of propaganda' 17• 
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While it was certainly true that the anti-Partition aspect of the proposed agency's 
activities had not figured as fully in the Dail debates as it had in the Cabinet 
discussions, this abrupt change of policy created a certain vacuum at the heart of the 
agency's activities, which was filled rapidly by a decision, taken by the new Board, to go 
into the business of providing 'hot news' both inside Ireland and overseas. This decision 
was taken for two reasons: because of a feeling by the Board that the agency's work on 
behalf of Ireland abroad would not be taken seriously by other media unless it was also 
acting as a normal news agency, and in order to broaden its revenue base. It was, of 
course, completely in conflict with the Minister's statements to the Dail, and Mr 
MacBride, 'while evidently regretting that he had been so explicit In the matter, agreed 
that the Board would have to act as it considered best.' 11'. It also immediately 
undermined any possibility of a friendly relationship with the rest of the domestic 
media. The agency grew rapidly in size, and in the scope of its aclivilies: within a year of 
its establishment it was producing about 9,000 words a day. The Advisory Board was 
never set up. 
The fact that the INA was certainly not a news agency in the generally accepted sense 
of the term did not deter those most directly associated with It, or those who saw it as a 
useful new career outlet in a country in which there had been little media change for at 
least a quarter of a century. There were some 200 applications for staff positions, and -
to at least some surprise- the position of General Manager was given, on 18 May 1950, 
to Joseph Gallagher, a journalist who had been born in London (his father came from 
Enniskillen}, but who had no Irish journalistic experience. Another key appointment was 
that of Brendan Malin, an Irish Press journalist with considerable experience of the Dail 
and pollttcal reporting, later to become an editor in Boston. The first Board comprised 
Board meeting, INA. from left: Robert Brennan (Director}, Noel Hartnett (Director}, Roger Greene 
(Chairman], Peadar O'Curry (Director}, Conor Cruise O'Brien (Managing Direc(or). 
Photo: Courtesty of Hugh Hartnett. 
the Dublin solicitor Roger Greene (Chairman). Tonor Cruise O'Brien, (Managing 
Director: this was only one of Dr. O'Brien's responsibilities: he retained others in his role 
as a Counsellor in the Department of External Affairs). and Board members Peadar 
O'Curry (later editor of the Irish Catholic). Robert Brennan and Noel Hartnetl19 • 
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The agency began its work unofficially by carrying out an Interview with the 
Taolseach, John A Costello, which was circulated Internationally In time for St. Patrick's 
Day, 1950. Its first official reporting assignment for the new agency was coverage of the 
St. Columbanus celebrations In Luxeuil In France In the summer of 1950. What the 
latter had to do with publicizing Ireland's anti-partition policy abroad demanded a 
certain effort of the imagination, but the air was already thick with flying straws. A 
checklist on 9 November revealed that the bulk of items published as a result of the 
agency's labours had been in newspapers or magazines in Ireland Itself, 312 In all, 
compared with 60 in the United States and 28 in other countries. In other words, much 
of the output of an agency designed for the export trade was In fact coming home to 
roost. This was particularly true of the British media, who - if they used INA copy at all 
- tended to use It only in the Irish editions of their publications, thus totally frustrating 
20 the Intentions of the agency's founder . 
The Irish Times, alone among Irish media, was relieved. Editorially welcoming the 
'change of heart' It detected In the Minister's remarks in the Dail, it suggested that 
criticism ... that seeks to sap confidence in It at this early stage is unworthy as well as 
unwise'. The agency's was a 'likely youngster', and the criticisms of it in the provincial 
press emanated from 'a common source'21 • Indeed, in the first two years of its existence, 
the agency operated with vigour and professionalism: even at this remove in time, It is 
possible to sense something of the excitement that is generated by the launch of a new 
media Institution staffed by able and keen young journalists22. Its total staff (including 
clerical, administrative and despatch personnel) numbered 48 by September 1952, 
including nine in London and two in Belfast. Along with some 100 free-lance 
correspondents, its staff journalists included Douglas Gageby as Editor in Chief, Jack 
Smyth, Derry Moran, John Healy (later 'Backbencher'). Karl Ross, Aidan O'Hanlon, 
Desmond Fisher (the INA 'Economics Editor' in 1953-54)23 , Philip Mooney, Lochlynn 
MacGlynn, Kevin O'Kelly (the INA Picture Editor), Kevin Collins and Michael Finlan. It 
had secured a back-to-hack agreement with the Hearst-controlled INS news service in 
the United States, whereby INS carried INA-generated stories for its American clients, 
while the INA had a monopoly on selling the INS service to Irish media clients. This 
arrangement, which echoed Robert Brennan's priorities in particular24, was seen as 
essential to the INA's successful functioning. So was its new photographic department, 
which achieved a coup of a kind by securing international distribution for the 'now 
famous picture of rioting in Derry City, showing Six-County policemen dispersing 
unarmed demonstrators'. Almost two decades before the Derry Civil Rights march was 
televized across the globe, the photograph was already a potent Instrument of political 
policy: this particular picture. the agency proudly informed the government, was known 
to have reached an audience of 8,500,000 people, and it was 'probably the first time that 
a highly important political fact- viz. that partition is maintained by force- has been so 
effectively brought across to an audience of large dimensions'25• The quasi-monopoly in 
the handling of Irish news for the world's press', the Agency's Board added with 
satisfaction, 'once possessed by two or three of the great international news agencies, is 
now broken. Secondly ... the state of affairs whereby all Irish news was edited in London 
26 before issue ... is now a thing of the past'. 
Critics of the INA 
While the new agency was thus trumpeting its triumphs, however, other forces, seen 
and unseen, were already gnawing away at its foundations. Professional journalistic 
pique (allied, in the case of the Irish Press, to political pique) at the well-subsidized 
nature of the agency's activities, was rapidly coming to the boil. From a different but 
equally predictable perspective, senior civil servants In the Department of Finance, 
viewing with alarm the agency's apparently insatiable appetite for cash advances, 
regarded with a growing scepticism Its increasingly articulate but ultimately 
unconvincing promises of better times to come. 
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Paddy Quinn, the Reuter correspondent In Dublin and a senior journalist on the 
Independent, voiced his displeasure about the activities of the INA to the Department of 
the Taoiseach to such an effect that an Investigation was set up. The Irish Press, 
enraged that an INA despatch on the famous 'Battle of Baltlnglass' had been published 
In the Gaelic American, thundered editorially that It was 'a shameful perversion of the 
truth. And the Irish public has to pay for it' 27 • 
The change of government on 14 June 1951 was accompanied by an Intensification 
of NUJ pressure. In Itself this was not surprising: members of the new administration 
had been openly hostile to the INA at Its Inception, and the NUJ presumably expected 
that they eould now count on new and powerful allies at court. Against the run of play, 
the new Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, hesitated, his scepticism held In 
check by some powerful lobbying from Within his own Department. Opposition 
questions from Fine Gael deputies Oliver J. Flanagan and Patrick Cogan, among others, 
pressed the Minister on the extent to which the INA was prepared to go into open 
competition with existing Irish media (as was indeed already happening). Aiken kicked 
to touch: the matters raised were 'soldy the responsibility of the board of directors of the 
Irish News Agency'. Lurking In his ministerial brief was a sheaf of arguments from Conor 
Cruise O'Brien, Including the fact that 'Nationalist Ulster' was particularly appreciative 
of the INA's work. 
At one point, Indeed, Aiken moved onto the offensive In support of the agency. The 
occasion was when the Irish Independent published an editorial on 8 May 1952 
complaining at the fact that the INA's picture desk, which acted as the Irish agency for 
the International Planet photographic group, had been issuing photographs of 'vast and 
enthusiastic crowds carrying giant portraits of Marshal Stalin lh Red Square'. The 
offending picture had in fact been published In the previous day's Issue of the Evening 
Herald. 'I do not allege,' Aiken told Sir John Esmonde, the Fine Gael TD who had 
unwisely raised the matter In the Dail, 
that the crowds In Red Square carried the giant portraits of Marshal 
Stalin because they were following the example of the Irish 
Independent, but within the last couple of years the Independent 
published pictures of Marshal Stalin with a smiling face; Marshal 
Stalin drinking a toast at the Kremlin; Marshal Stalin at dinner; and 
at least three other pictures of the same gentleman ... Indeed the 
Independent was so keen on publishing what it now calls Russian 
propaganda that in 1950 it ordered direct from the UP-Planet, and 
published, another photograph of massed units of the Red Army 
parading through Red Square. 
Warming to his task, he went on to Inform the Dail that 'the manager of the INA is the 
son of a TD, the brother of another, and brother of a senator. It will be news to these 
members of the Oireachtas that they are harbouring the chief of an anti-American, pro-
Russian cell' . 28 
The discussions with the NUJ had been precipitated by a demarche to de Valera on 
22 November 1951 from T.P. Kilfeather, on behalf of the Olreachtas Press Gallery, 
expressing the Gallery's 'grave concern' at the 'unfair and unjust competition' of the INA, 
and expressing its alarm at the 'continued encroachment' of the INA, whose activities 
should be confined to those 'not harmful to Irish journalists' .29 The nationality of those 
journalists currently employed by the INA was, conveniently, Ignored. The agreement 
between the INA and the NUJ, which Issued in a joint statement on 20 December, was a 
victory for the latter In all but name. Its main effect was 'to prevent the agency from 
selling domestic news or pictures to the Dublin dailies and the Cork Examiner ... 
Commercially, the effects of the agreement were naturally adverse' .30 The agency's 
defenders in the Department of External Affairs located responsibility for all of this In a 
small but rather Influential group of journalists who 
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are In large measure not engaged In the active collection of news. At 
least 90 per cent hold editorial positions on the Dublin daily 
newspapers and recast the news submitted to those newspapers by 
working journalists who receive no payment for the exported 
material. It Is easy to see why such vested Interests should be 
continuously and actively vocal in their opposition to a national news 
31 
agency which pays cash for all news written. 
The Independent alone numbered among Its staff journalists the Dublin 
correspondents of the Press Association, Reuters, Associate Press, the Exchange 
Telegraph, and a Canadian agency. External Affairs argued strongly that the agreement 
was being eroded In practice, and that the editors of the Dublin dailies frequently 
deplored It and urged the agency to scrap it, but without giving the agency any public 
32 
support on the Issue. Nor Indeed was the NUJ the only other organisation Involved. 
The Institute of Journalists (IOJ) entered the fray twelve months later, with a statement 
signed by Its secretary, Donal O'Donovan, registering a protest against the fact that 
1ournalists, as taxpayers, are compelled to contribute to a subsidy which is being used 
to menace their employment' .33 Eighteen months later, the Institute of Journalists, 
together with the Guild of Journalists, warned the INA that It was unwise to deal with 
the NUJ alone, and that the members of their organizations would not consider 
34 themselves bound by any agreement between the INA and the larger union. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs, In one of Its most waspish rejoinders, said that the IOJ 
memorandum was 'known to have been drafted by Reuter's correspondent in Dublin'.35 
Financial Problems 
The hard-headed servants of the Minister for Finance were not so easily put off the 
scent. Possibly emboldened by the knowledge that their new political masters were at 
best undecided about the value of the INA. they moved to take control of the debate, 
urging In a memorandum on 5 February 1952 that 'no time should be lost in 
reorganizing the agency on economic lines'. At this point the agency's losses for 1951-52 
were put at £45,000, and Its projected demand on the exchequer for the following year 
was for £40,000. For Its part, the agency submitted a steady stream of figures•to 
Finance, showing how the ratio between expenditure and Income was improving: the 
following table shows Its funding situation over the first four years of Its operatlon.36 
INA FINDING, 1950 - 1954 
Year Total Exchequer Commercial Exchequer as 
Expenditure Funding Sales %of total 
1950-51 £45,038 £30,000 £2,116 91.8% 1951-52 £46,335 £45,000 £4,253 
1952-53 £76,802 £63,500 £14,778 81.1% 
1953-54 £62,546 £45,000 £17,922 71.04% 
The Minister for External Affairs also argued that the method of financing the Agency 
was inappropriate, in as much as the monies used In the first three years of Its 
operation, although categorized as repayable cash advances, consisted In large part of 
capital sums. In Its first year in operation, he demonstrated, the ratio of expenditure to 
revenue had fallen from 129: I In the first quarter to 14.4:1 In the final quarter37• The 
Department of Finance, unimpressed, argued that the losses were Incurred because the 
agency was 
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merely duplicating at considerable cost to the taxpayer a service 
which Irish newspapers are fully equipped to obtain from their own 
reporting organisations or through foreign news agencies. 
Furthermore, the value from a national standpoint of some, at least, 
of the items transmitted abroad, e.g., strike of seamen at Dublin 
port, sporting events, suspension of Marshall Aid, is questionable. 
The agency, it argued, should be developed in such a way as to facilitate Its eventual 
disposal to the Irish newspapers to be run on a cooperative basis. 38 
The matter was brought to a head in July 1952, when the Cabinet was faced with a 
request for a supplementary estimate for the agency In ihe sum of £38,500. The Cabinet 
eventually agreed, but with considerable reluctance: the price was the agreement of the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the establishment, on 26 August 1952, of a special 
Cabinet subccommittee to include, along with the two ministers most directly concerned, 
the Minister for Education and the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. The Department 
of Posts and Telegraphs submitted some well-meaning but naive suggestions for 
reduction in costs, including the delightful proposal that foreign correspondents working 
in Ireland should be 'invited to plug Irish news of importance on a fee basis'. The 
Department of External Affairs shot down this particular brainwave with little difficulty: 
it would be 
open to the suggestion in Fleet Street that the Irish Government was 
attempting to corrupt journalists. The stories that were 'plugged' 
would stHI have to go to London offices who would be liable to throw 
them out - unless indeed it Is suggested that fees should be paid in 
London also, in which case the £15,000 suggested would not go very 
far' .39 
The question of reorganization was shelved, but came up again the following year, 
when a report on the agency's organization and methods was carried out by accountants 
4(1 Urwick, Orr and Partners for the Department. The report suggested that no. great 
changes could be recommended, and noted that 'discipline and morale undoubtedly 
reflect the enthusiasm and driving force of the General Manager and the Editor In Chief. 
The net cost to the agency of the Irish News Service (INS) of £4,000 per annum, it 
advised, 'should clearly be accepted as a policy expense'. 
In February 1953 Finance returned to the attack, stating bluntly that the agency 
should be wound up. Its decision on the dissemination of 'hot news' had been 
'completely at variance with the Minister's engagements to the Dail', and it had not been 
demonstrated that a continuance of the INA was warranted by Its values as a national 
institution. If it were to continue, Finance noted, with the air of a chess grandmaster 
who has just checkmated an opponent, 
there would be a need for careful supervision of the agency's 
activities to ensure that only material clearly conducive to the 
national Interest would be circulated by it for publication. 
Intervention of this kind would, inevitably; lead to charges of Civil 
Service control and Government Interference. The agency could 
hardly hope to survive under such conditions' .41 
External Affairs, replying, had to eat a certain amount of crow: the departure from the 
undertaking made by Mr MacBride In the Dail was acknowledged :__ but this undertaking 
itself had been unrealistic. That apart, the Department fell back on what was essentially 
MacBride's old position: that to wind up the agency now would be a confession that 
Ireland had failed 'to shake off Reuter's dominance over the field of Irish new~· . 42 
The Cabinet agreed to subsidize the agency to the tune of £45,000 for 1953-54, but 
determined that there should be no supplementary estimate, and that proposals for re-
organisation would have to be tabled. The writing was plainly on the wall. The INA. for 
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its part, staked everything on a last throw. It terminated its agreement with INS and, in 
August 1953, made a new agreement with the United Press (despite the hostility of the 
UP correspondent in Dublin). This Included taking over the UP contract with Radio 
Eireann, and Involved the agency going on a 24-hour footing for the first time. The 
Government - Initially unaware of this dramatic new commitment - was unimpressed, 
and decided In February 1954 that External Affairs, Finance, and the Attorney-General 
should consult on the drafting of a memorandum 'on the problems that would arise and 
the financial commitments that would be involved if it were decided to wind up the 
agency at an early date'. After this, events moved swiftly. Within a week, the 
Government subvention had been reduced by £10,000. Six days after this, an External 
Affairs memorandum revealed that the agency's assets were £64,240, and its liabilities 
£441,718- more than half of the latter sum being due to UP under the terms of Its 10-
year contract. The Attorney-General reported that the agency was 'hopelessly insolvent' 
and, on 26 February, the Cabinet agreed to provide the INA with £45,000 for 1954-55; 
that there would be no funding for subsequent years, and that 'the agency should be 
requested to take, without delay, whatever steps may be necessary in the light of the 
decisions above' .43 
Roger Greene, the INA chairman, embarked on a frantic last-ditch attempt to stave 
off closure. The British paper wall, he told Aiken on 11 March, would be strengthened 
by a hostile International press. A critical question, of course, was whether the UP 
agreement could be repudiated. Aiken plainly thought It could be, and told Greene on 26 
March that It would be 'futile' to seek a reversal of the Government's decision. Greene, 
while accepting that the UP contract could be terminated on a technicality, told Aiken 
on 8 April that Reuters had already been in Dublin propositioning some of the agency 
staff, and argued that 'the full significance of the Irish taxpayer having sunk 
approximately £200,000 in financing an Irish agency through its difficult formative 
years to hand it over to its main rival. a constant enemy of Ireland ... will not be lost on 
you'. The NUJ, he added, was already offering to close ranks in the light of this threat to 
the agency. Within the week, Greene had followed this up with a letter to de Valera, 
saying that a Government decision to bankrupt the agency would be 'an event without 
precedent in the history of the State'. Aiken replied on 23 April in a more eirenic tone, 
asking what effect a new agreement with the NUJ would have on the INA finances. 'De 
Valera, however, was less forthcoming, and did little more than forward a hostile opinion 
from the Attorney-General. Alndrlas 6 Caoimh, to Greene, over his own signature, on 31 
May. 
Dissolution 
Another change of Government on 2 June 1954, gave the agency an unexpected 
reprieve, and It seemed to enter an Indian summer. A Government decision on 2 July 
1954 effectively rescinded the previous government's decision to wind up the agency, 
but on condition that It ran a tight ship and submitted a further memorandum on its 
plans. The new Minister for Finance, Gerard Sweetman, was not unfavourable. Writing 
to Liam Cosgrave, the new Minister for External Affairs, on 20 August 1954, he argued 
for increasing the INA's revenues rather than decreasing its expenditure, and that it 
should be continued, at any rate, for a period. 
I know unofficially, that there is a possibility of a proposal being put 
forward that Radio Elreann should be governed by a corporation. I 
am prepared to explore even the possibility of fusing the agency and 
Radio Eire ann under the same direction. 44 
The following week the Government decided to set up an inter-departmental committee 
to examine the whole question, to reduce expenditure on the agency, and to explore 
possible synergies with F6gra Elreann, Radio Eireann, and the Department of Posts and 
Telegraphs, as well as the possibility of a new agreement with the NUJ. 
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The inter-departmental committee, whose secretary was Sean 6 hEidean, decided 
that it was not within the committee's remit to deal with the majorissue of policy, but 
reported that it had learned Informally that 'the opposition of the NUJ to the supplying 
of internal news in the 26 counties Is as strong as ever it was'. The most novel 
suggestion made by the committee as a cost-cutting exercise was that the agency's full-
time journalists should be replaced by stringers who would excerpt stories from the 
national media for export. 
Such a practice of 'milking' news is, we understand, quite common In 
the newspaper world ... The proprietors do not give approval of the 
practice but they tacitly allow It so as to enable their best men to get 
additional emoluments'. If this were done, it might be possible to run 
a smaller agency which would, in addition, be more acceptable to 
journalists. 45 
By this time, however, the tremors of Imminent dissolution had again begun to make 
themselves felt. J.P. Gallagher had resigned as General Manager. Roger Greene had 
died: F.W. Padbury had been appointed In his place, together with a new Board. Conor 
Cruise O'Brien had resigned, and with him, or so It seemed, some of the fight had gone 
out of the Department of External Affairs, which now told the Government that 'the 
material benefit which has accrued to the State from the operations of the agency has 
hitherto been negligible' .46 The option of winding up the agency was again put on the 
Cabinet table, but temporarily. withdrawn. The new Board, while It rejected the 
Department of Posts and Telegraph's plan to 'milk' the national media for the INA's 
export trade, was equally unrealistic when It proposed to External Affairs that the 
Agency be given the monopoly of the distribution of news emanating from abroad. The 
last option - disposal of the agency to the national newspapers - continued to be 
officially regarded as desirable, but Impossible. 
The agency might have dwindled gracefully to vanishing point over the following few 
years but for two other, contemporary factors. One was the unremitting hostility of the 
Irish Independent. which .of course generally supported the Inter~ Party Government. It 
published a hostile leading article describing the INA as 'a pure extravagance' on 9 
November 1954. It returned to the fray on 10 February 1955 with a plea to the 
Government to 'spare the community further losses' by winding up this 'unqualified 
failure' .47 On 9 January 1956 another leading article, Its arguments a virtual 
paraphrase of those that had gone before, described the INA as an 'Indefensible venture'. 
On 20 March its leader on the INA was entitled 'Pouring Money Down the Drain', and on 
22 May It described a proposal to allow the INA to engage In the general dissemination of 
news within Ireland as 'audacious'! Two days later, for good measure, it published two 
anonymous letters giving similar arguments against the agency's continued existence. 
More significantly, perhaps, the INA was also losing potentiai allies within the 
Cabinet. Early In 1956 the leader of the Labour Party, William Norton, wrote to Cosgrave 
to complain at the INA's circulation to Irish newspapers of a niisleadingly sub-edited 
version of a speech he had made to American Industrialists in the US. The misleading 
text had in fact come from United Press and, although the INA had on Its own account 
put out a correction and the full text of Norton's speech an hour later, The Irish Times 
had used the offending version. Norton went for the jugular, copying his letter both to 
the Taoiseach and to the Minister for Finance. 
I gather, that there is no obligation on the Agency to see that the 
reports which they are supplying to the press are In accordance with 
public policy ... I have doubts on whether It Is doing the job It was set 
up to do.46 
The last nail had been put .In the INA's coffin, but It took yet another change of 
Government to finally Inter the corpse. The decision to close the INA was actually 
announced by the Minister for Finance, Dr. James Ryan, on 8 May 1957, In advance of 
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the formal Cabinet decision on 4 June. 49 The Managing Editor and the Chairman 
received a year's emoluments In lieu of notice. Executives got six months, journalists 
three months, and administrative staff two months pay. In a pitiful coda, the NUJ 
finally, and vainly, bestirred Itself on behalf of its colleagues whose efforts It had been 
denigrating for most of the previous six years. Michael Mcinerney- whose personal bona 
fides were hardly in doubt, and who was acting on behalf of the Irish Area Council of the 
NUJ- wrote to the Taolseach on 13 May to say that the Union was 'profoundly shocked' 
by the decision, affecting as it did the sixteen NUJ members who were still on the INA 
staff, as well as 100 other members who acted as stringers. On 29 May the General 
Secretary of the Union, H.J. Bradley, wrote from London to Mr de Valera to express his 
Council's concern (in language which seemed to have been quarried directly from one of 
Mr Sean MacBride's speeches) that Ireland, alone of the Western European countries, 
should be without a national news agency, and Its perturbation 'that the employment of 
a considerable number of journalists In Dublin, Belfast, London, and the United States, 
would be affected by the closure of the agency' .50 With such unlikely mourners, and 
with little fanfare, the INA finally closed Its doors. Its obituary was a five-paragraph 
single-column story In The Irish Times, beginning: 'The Government-sponsored Irish 
News Agency, which was established in 1950, closed down last night. Its news service 
stopped at midnight' . 51 
Conclusion 
It is doubtful, given the circumstances of its birth, whether the INA could ever have 
been an unqualified success. Mr MacBride's parental pride blinded him to its many 
defects, and those who came after him were neither skillful enough nor, in the end, 
committed enough to overcome the hostility of key personnel in the journalistic 
profession and of the Department of Finance. One of these adversaries alone might have 
been enough to sink the enterprise - and yet the fact that it survived for so long in the 
teeth of such odds was Itself a tribute to the sinewy pertinacity of its staff. Many years 
later Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, translated now to the cabinet table as Minister for Posts 
and Telegraphs, returned to the theme with only a hint of wistfulness, urging the 
creation of an Irish News Agency 'based on, and run by, the newspapers of Irela,nd 
outside Dublin, with a certain amount of State support'. He said: 
The concept I have in mind, is something distinct from the old Irish 
News Agency ... A lot of good effort went to that Agency, and some of 
the best journalists in the country worked for it. But from its 
inception It suffered from certain radical defects. It was founded on 
the sole initiative of the Government of the day, without having 
enlisted the support of the press. Its ties to the State, and 
dependence on the State, were too close and too great. And it was 
aimed too much at the press outside this country, without being able 
adequately to fulfil the basic function of a normal news agency, 
which is to serve the press of its own country. I am convinced that a 
really viable Irish news agency must answer the needs of Irish 
newspapers, and must be controlled by them. It would also have to 
have the support of the journalistic profession and the National 
Union of Journalists. If those conditions could be fulftled the State 
would be prepared to help, but Its role would have to be one of 
support, not of leadership or control. 52 
The wheel had come full circle. 
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